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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

····-·-..

RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.ROMNEY LUMBER COMPANY, a
corporation, and BOARD OF EDUCATION of SALT LAKE CITY, a
public corporation, et al.,
Defendant(s) and Added
Defendant, Third Party
Plaintiff(s) and Respondents,
-vs.STATE OF UTAH,
Third Party Defendant and
Respondent.

Case Number
8469

BRIEF OF APPLELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(A)

Statement of Facts as to the Pleadings:

This was an action to quiet title to certain real property situate in Salt Lake City and County, (Rec. 1-2)
brought by plaintiff, Rennold Pender, under date of May
7th, 1952, against, as originally filed, the Romney Lumber Company, a corporation, and Salt Lake County, a
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municipal corporation, as defendants (Rec. 1-2). Later,
the defendant, Romney Lumber Company filed a third
party complaint against the State of Utah (Rec. 27-29),
pursuant to motion therefore (Rec. 26) and order of the
Court so permitting (Rec. 32). Answers to the complaint
(Rec. 4-5, 11-12), and to the Third Party Complaint (Rec.
38-40), were filed on behalf of the various defendants and
the State of Utah. Motion to substitute as a defendant,
the Board of Education of Salt Lake City, a public corporation, in the stead of Romney Lumber Company,
whose interest the former had acquired was thereafter
made (Rec. 41), and the Court (Rec. 43), entered an
order "adding" the Board of Education as a defendant.
Salt Lake County, a municipal corporation, later disclaimed, (Rec. 80) any title to the above described premises. Upon motion for summary judgment (Rec. 48),
made on behalf of defendant, Board of Education of Salt
Lake City, the Court (Rec. 77-78), entered judgment in
its favor that it was owner of the premises in dispute,
quieted its title against plaintiff, and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for similar relief as to quieting title in
him. Fr01n such judgment and decree, plaintiff Pender
appealed (Rec. 77 -78) to this Court.
(B)

Statement of Facts As To lJfaterial Events: ___ _

The land involved in the dispute, in Salt Lake City
and County, Utah, is more fully described in two different
ways, i.e.:
Lots 16 and 17, Block 13, Five Acre Plat "C", Big
Field Survey, in Section 16, Township 1 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
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and
Lot 4, Block 13, of Section 16, Township 1 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
(See Rec. 1, 12, 23, 30, 65-69, 77, 80, Exhibit "1"), .and this
fact is mentioned in order that the Court in examining
any matter pertaining thereto may avoid any misunderstanding as to the description ( s) of the tracts involved.
Plaintiff's title is deraigned through a series of
deeds, as shown in the abstract of title (Exhibit 1) dating
back to the Surveyor-General's survey certificate dated
February 28th, 1868 and recorded March 9th, 1868, showing possession then to have been in one John Prye, and
title passes through intermediate conveyances passing
title and possession down to the plaintiff herein, Rennold
Pender. (Later mention of other earlier bases for title,
obviates detailed mention at this point of same, but, reliance upon them is not waived because not here set out.)
The realty in question was apparently never patented
to the holders by the United States, although application
filed by the plaintiff Pender in 1952, (Rec. 51-52), was
rejected, as to further proceedings, until any adverse
claim of the State of Utah thereto was eliminated. This
suit followed for that purpose.
Title of the defendant, Board of Education of Salt
Lake, is deraigned through a conveyance from Romney
Lumber Company (Rec. 41, Exhibit 1, pages 83-4), which
latter corporation, in turn claims under an alleged patent
from the State of Utah to the ground in question, said
patent being dated July 19, 1943, and recorded August
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7th, 1943 (Exhibit 1, Page 25). The Board of Education
was a taker with notice of the pendency of plaintiff's suit,
when securing conveyance to itself of said property on
May 5th, 1955 (Exhibit 1, Page 83-4) as pendency of suit
was set out in said deed to it, and, since the lis pendens
filed by the plaintiff, (Exhibit 1, page 82), had already
been on record since 1\{ay 6th, 1953.
No claim of adverse possession by the Board of Education of Salt Lake andjor its predecessor, Romney Lumber Company, by reason of any alleged ownership and
possible possession and payment of taxes since date of
the purported State patent arises, since, in .answers to
interrogatories made by the Romney Lumber Company
(Rec. 34, Paragraphs V, VI, answering interrogatories
of plaintiff numbered 7, 8, 9), it does not claim title by
adverse possession or usage of the tract, or any part,
since inception of its alleged title.
The controversy involved in the litigation arises
over whether or not the ground in question as part of a
Section 16 area, is, or ever became property of the State
of Utah, by virtue of the enabling act, Section 15 of the
Organic Act of 1850, creating the etah Territory, or
otherwise, so, that the State of l~tah, could by conveyance
or patent convey .any title to Romney Lumber Company;
or, as opposed to the State's claim on the basis of a school
section, whether the undisturbed possession and usage
of the ground of the plaintiff and his predecessors for
smnething like 84 years, as shown by the .abstract: and,
as disclosed by an old plat of the .area, filed with the
Pioneer Plats in Salt Lake County Recorder's Office
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(Rec. 66-67), there was a settlement of the area in question prior to the first official survey of the land involved
herein, so as to antedate September lOth, 1856, the date
of said survey (Rec. 50), which, settlement, would be
sufficient, as hereinafter set forth in the argument, under
the various applicable land laws of the United States,
relating to school grants, to prevent any title of the Territory or State of Utah attaching thereto, as a school grant
of that p.art of a Section 16. Other material facts concerning the issues will be set forth during the course of
the argument.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
SINCE FACTUAL MATTERS ARE INVOLVED, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE MATTER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT.

POINT II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
QUIETING TITLE IN FAVOR OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE, INSTEAD OF QUIE'TING TITLE IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE FACTUAL MATTERS ARE INVOLVED, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE MATTER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides,
in pertinent part, that:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith, if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." - Summary Judgment.
If any genuine issue of fact exists, the court should
not determine the matter on motion. Or, as said in Young,
et al v. Felnoria, et al, ______ Utah ______ , 244 Pacific 2d, 862
(page 863):
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is
any genuine issue as to any material fact, the
motion [for summary judgment] should be denied."
In accord, see R. J. Daum Canst. Co. v. Child, _____ _
Utah ______ , 247 Pacific 2d, 817 (at page 818).
Here, there is involved the disputed question of
whether or not the title of the plaintiff should be quieted
as against the title of the defendant, and there is a denial by the defendant ( s) of the allegations of plaintiff
respecting his title.
Under such circumstances, it has been held in the
Federal Courts, interpreting a silnilar rule, that :
"In making a motion for judgn1ent . . . the
moving party is deemed to have admitted the truth
of his adversary's allegations and the untruth of
all of his own allegations which have been denied
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by the adversary. However, such admission is only
for the purposes of the motion, and is not final,
binding, and conclusive, so as to amount to a
waiver of any material issue. Consequently, the
fact that the defendant has made such a motion
did not eliminate all issues of fact so as to authorize summary judgment for the plaintiff." M. Snower & Company v. U.S., 7 F.R. Serv. 12c.25, Case 1,
140 Fed. 2d, 488, as stated in 4 Fed. Rules Digest,
2d Ed., page 166.
"Where inconsistent hypotheses might be
drawn from the facts and the facts reveal aspects
as to which the minds of reasonable men might
differ, and there is a substantial controversy as to
how the parties view their respective rights and
obligations, the court should not grant summary
judgment, without making findings of fact and
conclusions of law." Winter Park Tel. Co. v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 F. R. Serv. 56.41,
Case 2, 181 Fed. 2d, 341, as stated in 4 Fed. Rules
Digest, 2d Ed., page 161.
"Summary judgment should be granted only
if it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable
to clarify the application of the law. This is true
even where there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions to be
drawn therefrom." Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson
Co., 14 F. R. Serv. 56c.41, Case 3, 181 Fed. 2d, 390,
as stated 4 Fed. Rules Digest, 2d Ed., page 161.
In the instant case there is a sharp divergence of
opinion as to both facts and conclusions to be drawn from
the same. The date of September lOth, 1856, and the
question of whether or not there is a showing of title
prior to that time are the mooted questions, and, even
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though the facts, as to the ones presented by either plaintiff's evidence or defendant's evidence, are admitted or
undisputed, still, there is a determination of fact to be
made, whether or not, there was a settlement upon the
ground in question, under the circumstances required by
the federal law, prior to the first survey thereof, so as
to preclude the land over which this litigation is had,
from being or becoming a school section, and property,
ultimately of the State of Utah.
Plaintiff's position, of course, is that the plat of
"Plot C", so-called (Rec. 66-67), and the notations thereon (all as more fully set out in argument under Point
II, hereafter) establish a settlement upon the said lands
with a view to preemption or homesteading before the
survey of the lands in the field, on sections 16 or 36, so
as to subject said sections to the claims of settlers, rather
than to become school lands.
It is submitted, that there was a genuine issue of
fact (or issues of fact), as to whether or not there was
a settle1nent upon these lands herein involved with a view
to preemption or homestead, prior to Septe1nber lOth,
1856 (the date of the field survey acceptance, Rec. 50),
so as to pre~nt the attachn1ent of the reservation of the
section in favor of the territorial or state schools. Such
issue or issues, being real, were to be determined on hearing and trial of the cause, rather than on sun1mary judgment procedure, and, consequently, the trial Court erred
in so detennining the sa1ne on motion rather than on trial,
which constituted reversible error on its part, and to
which exception is taken by appellant herein.
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POINT II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
QUIETING TITLE IN FAVOR OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE, INSTEAD OF QUIETING TITLE IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT.

Chapter 20, Title 43, Section 851, United States
Code Annotated, entitled, Deficiencies in Grants to State
by Reason of Settlements, etc., on Designated Sections,
Generally, reads:
"Where settlements with a view to preemption
or homestead, have, been, prior to February 26,
1859, or shall thereafter be made, before the survey of the lands in the field, which are found to
have been made on sections 16 or 36, those sections
shall be subject to the claims of such settlers, and
if such sections or either of them shall have been
or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged, for the
use of schools or colleges in the State or Territory
in which they lie, other lands of equal acreage are
hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected by said State or Territory, in lieu of such
as may thus be taken by preemption or homestead
settlers."
This is substantially the same language as contained
in Sections 2275-76, Revised Statutes of the United
States, 26 Statutes at Large page 796, 51 Congress, Session II, adopted February 28th, 1891, which statutes are
expressly made applicable to the handling of school lands,
by the Act of ~Iay 3, 1902, Public Law 102, Ch. 183, 32
Statutes at Large Page 188, 57 Congress, Chapter 683,
as regards the State of Utah, "anything in the act approved July 16th, 1894, providing for the admission of
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said State of Utah to the union, TO THE CONTRARY
NOT WITHSTANDING."
Consequently, where there was a settlement WITH
A VIEW to preemption or homestead, the lands if unsurveyed, and later found to be on school sections, never
became "reserved" for school purposes, within the provisions of Section 15, Organic Act of September 9th, 1850,
as set forth at Page 34, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1876,
which provided:
"Section 15 : Be it further enacted, That when
the land in said territory shall be surveyed under
the direction of the government of the r nited
States, preparatory to bringing the same into
market, sections numbered 16 and 36 in each township in said territory shall be, and the same are
hereby reserved, for the purpose of being applied
to the schools in said territory, and in States and
Territories, hereafter to be erected out of the
same."

It is to be particularly noted, that the statute does not
require "PREEMPTION" or "HOMESTEAD~', as such,
to withdraw from the purvieu~ of the reservation of
lands for the schools, said sections 16 or 36, BUT, ONLY
THAT THERE BE A SETTLEP.fENT WITH A VIEW
TO HOMESTEAD OR PREEMPTIOl\r.
AND, IF THAT CONDITIOX BE MET, then the
lands in question net'er did become the property of either
the territory, under section 15 of the Organic Act, or, of
the State, 1rhen it acceded to the rig·hts of the territorial
government, and there would be no succession in the State
of Utah, to the grant of those lands.
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It might be appropriate to point out here, also, that
while preemption was an act toward perfecting the title
to lands and obtaining the same from the federal government under the various land laws, and perhaps necessary
as between possessors or settlers, both claiming the same
ground, that even this Court, in construing Federal Court
Decisions on the nmtter, commented, as in Hamblin v.
State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187
Pac. 178, as respects Section 2266, Revised Statutes of
United States, 1878, relating to the necessity for
filing a preemption right within three months from date
of receipt of the approved plat of the land that might
be claimed, at the district land office, that :

"In construing the section of the act of Congress above quoted, as far as we have been able
to ascertain, th~e Courts have uniformly held it
to be directory only." Quoting Landsdale v. Daniels, 100 U.S. 113, 25 L. Ed. 587; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. Ed. 485; Hollingshead v.
Simms, 51 Cal. 188, etc., "Our investigation of
this question fails to discover any case in conflict
with these decisions, nor does there appear to be
any logical reason against the doctrine therein
announced."
Coming now to the situation disclosed by the plaintiff's facts and theory-of-the case, we find:
(a) Land Certificate by Jesse W. Fox, Territorial
Surveyer, issued to John Prye (name miscopied into
later county records as "John Poy," and the description
as Block 15, instead of Block 13, see Rec. 65, Certified
copy of Abstract Record Page giving correct details as
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to name ,and block, and Rec. 68-9, Certified Copy of
Book B-8, page 137, showing name and lots involved), on
February 25th, 1868, and recorded March 9th, 1868, (Exhibit 1, Page 1). No controversy exists as to the correctness of the name or description of the ground.
By virtue of an act of the Utah Territorial Legislature Approved January 9th, 1866, Mr. John Prye was established ,as the person holding "title of possession," of
the said ground herein in controversy. The provisions
of said act are, as found on page 95, Compile~ Laws of
Utah, 1876, as follows:
"(68) Section 1: Be it enacted by the Governor and Legislative Assembly of the Territory
of Utah: That the surveyor general is hereby authorized and required to give, to the person for
whom he-- makes ,a survey, a certificate thereof,
describing the tract, block, or lot, and specifying
its area, such certificate SHALL BE TITLE OF

POSSESSION TO THE PERSON HOLDING
IT."

This possession, invested in Mr. John Prye, in 1868, has
through intermediate conveyances, down to the present
time, been carried over to the plaintiff and appellant
herein, and no act of divesture has ever been shown to
have taken pl,ace.
But, inherent in this very procedure which established l\1r. John Prye as the title holder of possession
of the ground in 1868, is the inference that he must have
been in possession prior to the date when the survey
certificate was rnade, in order to have had the survey
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made, and the facts necessary for the surveyor general
to know, ascertained. So, we may indulge in the presumption that Mr. Prye was in possession and on the ground
prior to February 25th, 1868.
It is well known to title examiners, that the early
recordings of deeds and transfers and the like relating to
lands, were not made with the nicety that we observe
today, and, that there are, as far as the county records
are concerned, many gaps in titles prior to and during
the period of 1860 to 1870 or thereabouts. So, that it is
quite possible that Mr. Prye obtained his possession from
some earlier or original settler on the ground. Which
latter fact brings us to :

(b) The certified copy of the so-called "Plot 'C' "
(Rec. 66-67), obtained from the Salt L.ake County Recorder's Office, and containing on the one sheet, a showing
of the linear outlines of the lots, blocks, and parts of Plot
"C" [covering the property herein in dispute], and a
further sheet showing what is an ownership plat, with
each lot being marked with a name or names, as owners.
In respect to Lots 16 and 17, Block 13, we find the name
"D. Hendrix," appearing as the lot owner or holder. But,
the most significant thing about the instrument in question, is that it bears the notation that it was:

"COPIED FROM OLD PLOT BY LEO HAWKINS,
G.S.L. CO. Recorder, -1857."
Obviously, if the Plot was copied from an "old" plot
in 1857, the original must have been older, at least, than
the date of December 31st, 1857, and the question arises
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as to how "old was old." By dictionary definition, the
term "old" has been said to mean:

"1. Having existed for a long time; aged;"
"3. Having been used or known for a long time."
Now, let us apply the term to the situation then
existing. Utah was in a sense, a new country, having
been settled in 1847, yet as a decade had elapsed since
its settlement, much had been accomplished. So, in 1857,
the copied "plot" being from an "old" plot, relatively,
might go back as far as ten years. If the "plot" referred
to as the original fron1 which the copying had been done,
had been made in 1857, it would hardly have been referred
to as "old," nor, would there have been any need for an
immediate recopying of the same, and, inserting the
ownership names thereon would take some time, too,
so, it would appear that the "old" plot would antedate
the year 1857. From the "plot" itself, (Rec. 66-67), it
would appear that the land was laid out in blocks, lots,
and tr.acts, and, that same was based on some kind of a
survey that had been made to lay out that land known or
to be known as Plat or Plot "C." Since, a survey could
not be made without expenditure of some time, and, as
it would take time, after survey of the same to compile
the ownership data, or indeed, to permit transfer to ,as
many individuals as appear to be owners thereon, and,
as, surveying would be unlikely during the wintertime, it
would appear to have been n1ade earlier, at least, than
the fall of 1856, in order to be within the we.ather limits
of 1856 season, and the tilne basis in 1naking it up. And,
yet, in considering how far we n1ust push back to find
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the extent of the world "old," it would appear that at
most, we need set back the time to cover only the time
to a day prior to September lOth, 1856, a matter of less
than four months, to bring the time when settlement on
the land with a view to homesteading or preemption,
would give the settlers priority over any reservation for
school usages, since the survey would not then have been
completed. Surely, it would not be unreasonable to extend
the meaning of the word "old" a few months to bring it
ahead of the date of September lOth, 1856, when the plat
now in the land office as the survey of that section 16,
Township 1 South, Range 1 East, S.alt Lake Meridian
was approved.
Nor, can it be doubted, if the land was laid out into lots, blocks, and like, with spacing intervening for
streets or approaches, that there was no intent not to
homestead or preempt the land, in order to perfect title.
But, as before noted, there was no requirement of an
ACTUAL PREEMPTION, or IMMEDIATE HOMESTEADING, but, only WITH A VIEW TO THE SAME.
Now, if the land had been surveyed "AFTER" settlement with a view to preemption or homestead, WOULD
IT BE LIKELY that the same would be divided into
lots, blocks, streets, and the like, when the contempary
people had the advantage of knowing the reservations
in Section 15 of the Organic Act creating the Territory
of Utah, making this school land~ Indeed, it would be
most unlikely for them to go on through all the motions
that they did to plat the land, divide it up, sell, or
trade the sa1ne, knowing all the time, (if their actions
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were assumed to take place after September lOth, 1856)
that it was school land, and could never be theirs?
Futility was not the habit of the pioneers, and the very
list of names on the ownership plat would militate against
any such a useless proceeding. The very consideration
of the situation shows its absurdity, and, makes obvious
the only sensible conclusion, which is that the parties did
know what they were doing, that it was not futile, and
it did antedate September lOth, 1856. In the absence
of contrary information, we must assume that what the
settlers did was legal, and, that they did not take action
for the purposes of usurping school lands that might
inure to the benefit of the territory. There is every presumption as to legality and regularity of their acts.
And, of course, as shown by the record (Rec. 71, 72,
73, 74, 75) other areas of the same section 16, of Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake :Meridian, were
patented under homestead entry, and the title of the
settler or settlers perfected, which would certainly negative the idea that the title of the territory or of the state
was so firmly attached to these lands that any other prospective settler was forever excluded therefrom, insofar as
getting title was concerned. Certainly, the general land
office in \V ashington would not have let slip by patent
proceedings to land "reserved" for the territory, without a proper showing that the reservation was indeed
ineffective in smne manner as to the land in question.
The record also shows that the state went further and
selected lieu lands for those patented under the proceedings above mentioned.

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The case of Ferry vs. Street, as reported in 11
Pacific Reporter, 571, 4 Utah, 521 (1888), is interesting
in this respect, as showing that title to unsurveyed sections, if settlement thereon was made before date of
survey, and same by the survey were determined to be
school sections, was nevertheless retained in the settlers,
and school title reservations did not attach; and that
the same was true, even of sections which because of
the survey of adjacent sections could almost be bounded
by reason of the corners of the adjacent sections being
fixed. Actual survey was required.
It is of no avail for defendant and respondent to
argue that the present title may still be in the United
States, and, that for any of a number of various reasons
it is not, or should not be in the plaintiff and appellant.
For, in a quiet title action, it is so well settled as not to
need citation here and now, that the party recovering
must recover upon the strength of his own title, not
upon any weaknesses of his adversary's title. Yet,
through just such inferences, the trial courut was lured
into its erroneous decision in favor of the defendant
Board of Education of Salt Lake; whereas, the truth
of the matter is, because of the matters relating to title
as above set forth, that insofar as the Lots 16 and 17,
of Block 13, of Five Acre Plat C, Township 1 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, Salt Lake County,
Utah, are concerned, they never were school land, nor
were they reserved for such purposes, hence did not pass
to the State of Utah, and so its purported grant to
Romney Lumber Company. a corporation, who conveyed
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to the defendant Board of Education of Salt Lake City,
is of no effect, and, the title of plaintiff and appellant
should be quieted as against pretensions of any of the
defendants and respondents, claiming under such invalid grant by the State of Utah. Failure so to decree
constitutes reversible error.
Once the adverse interest of defendants and respondents is quieted in favor of appellant herein, he
can, of course, proceed under Section 1068, United States
Code Annotated, as amended, to secure title as an adverse holder of the land for more than 20 years, or for
a period commencing not later than January 1st, 1901,
(Section 10, USCA, Title 43, Page 64 Cumulative Annaual Pocket Part), .and, in such connection no preemption, homestead, or the like is required, and, there are
no questions of transfer of possessory rights, or the
like, or any inability or restriction to so do involved.
CONCLUSION
It was therefore, it is respectfully submitted, and as
set out in Points I and II of the argument, hereinabove,
error on the p.art of the trial court to decide the case
on motion for summary judgment, and to give judgment
for the defendant-respondent, Board of Education of
Salt Lake City, and to dis1niss the plaintiff-appellant's
complaint without granting hiln the relief sought by him
quieting his title to said ground.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff and appellant prays
this Honerable Court to reverse the holding of the trial
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court, and to remand the same for further proceedings
in accordance with the principles set forth herein, or, for
the Supreme Court to find for the appellant-plaintiff,
and, enter a proper decree and judgment in his favor.
Respectfully submitted,

R. S. JOHNSON
Attorney-for-Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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